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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the likelihood of the emergence of an alternative center for investment arbitration—a very much debated, if
not favored, option in some policy circles. We argue that given the
current market dominance of the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), the emergence of institutional
competition from other regions of the world is constrained by network effects.
Network effects arise when the value that consumers derive from
a good increases as others also use the good. (Language is the classic
example.) As more users adopt the good and its utility is enhanced,
additional consumers flock to the good, creating positive feedback.
When a market has settled upon a single standard, the market is said
to have “tipped.” This gives rise to a monopoly-type situation that
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prevents potential rivals from successfully challenging the market
dominance of the prevailing standard, creating what is known as
“institutional lock-in.”
After explaining the concept of institutional lock-in, we explore
its salience in the investment arbitration realm. We find that this
model is robust and its impact discernible in the current investment
arbitration environment. Notwithstanding this finding, certain exogenous events could substantially reduce or even annihilate this
effect. To this end, potential “disruptive events”—such as the European Union’s push for an investment “court,” potential competition
from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) or other arbitration centers, and unforeseen legislative changes—are explored.
These events could undermine the market dominance of ICSID and
trigger either a large-scale coalescence around an alternative institution or, rather more likely, the parceling out of investment arbitration among multiple competitors until the market again coalesces
around a new standard. However, we conclude that in the absence
of a strong exogenous shock, the institutional lock-in of ICSID will
be difficult to dislodge.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In many ways investment arbitration is a unique form of arbitration in that it involves private entities settling legal disputes with
state actors. It is also a relatively new form of arbitration. It only
gained wide usage starting in the late 1960s when the first bilateral
investment treaties (“BITs”) containing investment arbitration were
created,1 and the first investment treaty arbitration award was not
issued until 1990.2 Yet investment arbitration has now become the
chief means of dispute settlement between foreign investors and
states—it is how private actors redress their legal rights beneath the
awesome shadow of state power.
Presently, the world of international investment arbitration is
dominated by a single center for dispute resolution—the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”),
which is headquartered in the United States in Washington D.C. It

1 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different are
They Today? 28 ARB. INT’L 577, 577-78 (2012). Investment arbitrations also were facilitated when the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States (i.e., the ICSID Convention), a World Bank
sponsored multilateral treaty, was opened for signature in 1965. Investment
arbitration can involve an arbitration based on the violation of an investment treaty,
it can be based on an investment contract between a host state and a foreign
investor, or it can arise from the investment law of the state hosting the investment.
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes].
2 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case
No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, (June 27, 1990), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C140/DC676_En.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PK9N-PFX8].
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is, in practice, an institutional near-monopoly in the field of investment arbitration.3 This Article examines the likelihood of the emergence of an alternative center for investment arbitration—a very
much debated, if not favored, option in some policy circles—from a
law and economics perspective, an analytical tack that provides a
great deal of explanatory power, as we will show.
We argue that given the current market dominance of ICSID, the
emergence of institutional competition from other regions of the
world is constrained by network externalities (i.e., what is known as
network effects in the literature).4 Network effects arise where the implicit value of a service (or product) increases as the number of other
agents using the same service grows. As more users use the service
and its utility is enhanced, additional consumers flock to the service,
and on it goes, creating a positive feedback loop. (The process is also
captured by the concept of increasing returns.)5 When a market has
settled upon a single standard for the service with all competitors
eliminated or significantly marginalized, the market is said to have
“tipped.”6 Once a market has tipped, it creates a monopoly-type situation that prevents potential rivals from successfully challenging
3 The term “monopoly” here is carefully deployed. ICSID may be understood
as a monopoly in that the network externalities that inhere in the market for investment arbitration inhibit market competition, creating barriers to entry. For all intents and purposes, the dynamic functions as a monopoly. ICSID is not, however,
a monopoly in the formal sense of a firm strategically engaging in anti-competitive
practices.
4 We use the terms “network externalities” and “network effects”
interchangeably throughout the Article.
5 For the foundational literature on network effects and its focus on path dependence, see Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
332 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989); W.
Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92 (1990); W. BRIAN
ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994); S. J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 205 (1995); see also Paul A. David, Why are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’?: Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON. DYNAMICS 205 (1994).
6 William Page & John E. Lopatka, Network Externalities, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS VOLUME I: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND
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the market dominance of the prevailing standard. The market for
investment arbitration, we argue, has tipped.
Our argument draws on the concept of institutional lock-in, first
put forward by Douglass C. North, whose work in the area won him
a Nobel Prize in 1993.7 North argues that institutional lock-in occurs
because the constitutive nature of institutions—what North refers to
as “the interdependent web of an institutional matrix”—generates
massive increasing returns.8 This process of increasing returns
causes institutional frameworks to gradually become deeply entrenched over time and, as a consequence, more difficult to dislodge.9 Consequently, institutions that already enjoy a foothold
“generate powerful inducements that reinforce their own stability
and further development.”10 Because ICSID presently dominates
the investment arbitration service world, which can be understood
as a market for specific legal dispute resolution services, network
effects are being generated that bolster and further entrench this
market dominance, stymieing and precluding competition from

ECONOMICS 952, 960 (Boudwijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). For the
concept of tipping, see also THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND
MACROBEHAVIOR 92–94, 98–99 (1978).
7 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 73–104 (1990) (positing that institutional development may produce
a path-dependent pattern of development over time); see also Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000)
(arguing political institutions are particularly vulnerable to this process); Paul
Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes, 14 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 72 (2000); Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: Insight from Comparative Historical Analysis, in COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 208–40 (James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer eds., 2003) (discussing
the “feedback mechanisms” that steer institutional and policy trajectories over
time).
8 NORTH, supra note 7, at 95. North, however, defines institutions in a very expansive manner. See NORTH, infra note 11.
9 Id.
10 Paul Pierson, Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in
Affluent Democracies, in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE, 410, 415 (Paul
Pierson ed., 2001).
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elsewhere. As a result, the market for investment arbitration services is, we argue, experiencing a form of institutional lock-in.11
While we feel this model is robust and its impact discernible in
the current investment arbitration environment, certain exogenous
events could occur that may substantially reduce or altogether annihilate this effect. The possibility of such “disruptive events” does
not contradict the model; rather, it renders the model more nuanced.
Network effects suggest that the robust emergence of an alternative
center for investment arbitration would prove extremely difficult;
however, given several unknown factors, it remains a possibility.
For example, the European Union has succeeded in establishing a
“permanent” court and “Appellate Body” in the texts of the EU-

11 The definition of an “institution” as North uses it, however, bears explanation.
While the idea encompasses conventional organizations such as universities, trade
unions, churches, and corporations, North understands “institutions” in a very expansive sense: “Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, more formally,
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” NORTH, supra
note 7, at 3. Institutions, North informs us, “include any form of constraint that
human beings devise to shape human interaction . . . . They can be either . . . formal
constraints—such as rules that human beings devise—and informal constraints—
such as conventions and codes of behaviour. Institutions may be created, as was
the United States Constitution; or they may simply evolve over time, as does the
common law.” Id. at 4.
In this sweeping sense, institutions may be better understood as “a special type
of social structure that involves potentially codifiable and . . . normative rules of
interpretation and behavior.” Geoffrey M. Hodgson, What are Institutions?, 11 J.
ECON. ISSUES 1, 4 (2006). They are frameworks wherein “[m]embers of the relevant
community share tacit or explicit knowledge of these rules.” Id. at 3. This broad
understanding of institutions can be traced back to Thorstein Veblen in the early
literature on institutionalism—Veblen defined institutions as the “settled habits of
thought common to the generality of men.” Thorstein Veblen, The Limitations of
Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON. 620, 626 (1909). While North clearly distinguishes
between organizations and institutions, organizations can be understood as a subset of institutions. See 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: A–K 535 (Phillip
Anthony O’Hara ed., 1999). We use the term “institution” here in its narrower and
more conventional sense (i.e., as a hierarchical organizational arrangement that regulates a form of human interaction) in this particular case, disputes related to investment arbitration. Thus, we diverge from North in that we are not so much
concerned with organizations becoming locked into potentially sub-optimal rules
and norms—rather, we are interested in how actors become locked into an organization itself—i.e., ICSID.
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Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”)12 and the Comprehensive
Trade and Economic Agreement between Canada and the European
Union (“CETA”)—and has proposed that a similar body be included
in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“T-TIP”).13
The question is which institution (or institutions) will host these
bodies, and whether these agreements ever enter into force. At present, the European Union has proposed either the Permanent Court
of Arbitration (“PCA”) or ICSID as administrators in both the T-TIP
and the EU-Vietnam FTA, but ICSID alone has been chosen as the
administering institution in CETA; however, in principle, any number of institutions may be selected in future agreements. Whether
or not the European Union becomes a party to ICSID Convention
might play a role in ICSID’s continued dominance. Also considered
are regional preferences, for instance, Singapore has taken initiatives
to establish itself as a premier center for commercial arbitration and
has recently released rules specific to investment arbitration.14
The Singapore International Arbitration Centre, some similar institution, or even a combination of institutions, may yet succeed in
displacing the market dominance of ICSID. Such exogenous factors
would short-circuit the network effect pressures in the market for
investment arbitration, as would other potentially disruptive
events. The conclusion we reach is that network effects are indeed
currently at play and powerfully reinforce the market dominance of
ICSID. However, while this dominance is likely to continue in the

12 Catharine Titi, The European Union’s Proposal for an International Investment
Court: Significance, Innovations and Challenges Ahead, 14 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1
(2017).
13 See REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 119 (Andreas Kulick ed., 2016). Now that the Court of Justice of the European Union has
determined that investor-state dispute settlement and portfolio investment are subject to shared competence, those portions of the EU’s FTAs will not enter into force
until they are approved by the individual EU Member States. See infra Section 4.2.
14 Singapore Int’l Arbitration Centre [SIAC], SIAC IA Rules 2017, [hereinafter
SIAC, SIAC IA Rules 2017] http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-ia-rules2017 [https://perma.cc/D5HA-HW98] (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). For a more general discussion of the increasing importance of commercial arbitration in various
Asian countries, see SIMON GREENBERG, CHRISTOPHER KEE & J. ROMESH
WEERAMANTRY, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN ASIA-PACIFIC
PERSPECTIVE 36–37 (2011).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/3

2018] Institutional Lock-in Within Investment Arbitration

715

foreseeable future, the long-term continuation of ICSID’s dominance in the market for investment arbitration is by no means guaranteed.
We develop our argument in three parts. Section 2 outlines how
network effects operate, and describes the related concept of institutional lock-in. Section 3—the heart of our argument—argues that
network effects are manifest with respect to the dominance of ICSID
in the market for investment arbitration. To this end, three sources
of increasing returns are examined: the first relates to the impression of institutional legitimacy; the second relates to predictability
and familiarity regarding the rules and procedures of an arbitral institution; and the third concerns the general quality and scope of arbitral service. The critical issue of sub-optimal institutional lock-in
is also briefly discussed. After constructing the core of our argument, Section 3 considers the variety of exogenous shocks that may
disrupt institutional lock-in—what we call “disruptive events.”
Several possibilities are considered, such as the European Union’s
push for an investment “court,” potential competition from the PCA
or other arbitration centers, and unforeseen legislative changes. Section 5 concludes the Article.
2. NETWORK EFFECTS AND INSTITUTIONAL LOCK-IN UNPACKED

2.1. Network Effects
Network externalities, or network effects, were first discussed as
early as 1974 by Jeffrey Rohlfs, who identified the phenomenon in
the context of telephone systems.15 The idea was taken up again in
the mid 1980s, with Katz and Shapiro’s foundational work on the
subject, and has since been further explored in the literature.16 The

15 Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service,
5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974).
16 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 5.
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idea of network effects is relatively straightforward: A network effect occurs where the implicit value of a product or service increases
as the number of other agents using the product or service grows,
which in turn draws more users.17 This creates a dynamic of increasing returns. The often-used example of a network effect is language.18 Language is fundamentally predisposed to a network effect.19 The more people who, for example, speak English, the more
useful English is to each one of its speakers. As English grows in
popularity, so too does its value, encouraging further growth in a
“snowball-like” fashion.20
There are numerous other examples of network effects—e.g., telephone networks, railway gauges, computer software, credit cards,
videotape standards, currencies, electrical outlets, screw thread
sizes, or even time zones.21 The dynamic reinforces bourgeoning

17 See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671, 671 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
18 For a very good overview of other network effect examples in a wide range of
contexts, see Joseph Ferrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition
and Switching Costs and Network Effects, 3 HANDBOOK INDUS. ORG. 1970 (2006).
19 Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 489 (1998) (“Language, for example, is the fundamental
medium of communication and could be said to have both negligible inherent value
to the first speaker and increasing value over the range of additional speakers.”);
see also S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon
Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 136 (1994); Amitai Aviram, A Network Effects Analysis
of Private Ordering (Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series, 2003) 15. For a more in-depth analysis of the network effects of language, see,
e.g., Jeffery Church & Ian King, Bilingualism and Network Externalities, 26 CAN. J.
ECON. 337 (1993).
20 See Bryan Druzin, Buying Commercial Law: Choice of Law, Choice of Forum, and
Network Externalities, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 151 (2009) (arguing that network effects induce standardization in choice of law and choice of forum clauses in
transnational commercial contracts).
21 For a very good overview of other network effect examples in a wide range of
contexts, see Ferrell & Klemperer, supra note 18. For other inquiries along these
lines, see Dominique Foray, The Dynamic Implications of Increasing Returns: Technological Change and Path Dependent Inefficiency, 15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 733 (1997); JAMES
SIMMIE, PATH DEPENDENCE AND NEW PATH CREATION IN RENEWABLE ENERGY
TECHNOLOGIES 9 (2016).
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patterns, causing the patterns to become progressively more entrenched over time, which ultimately gives rise to a monolithic
standard. Markets subject to increasing returns will initially exhibit
multiple equilibria, but will “finally lock-in to a monopoly with one
standard cornering the entire market.”22 Thus one technology that
“by chance gains an early lead in adoption may eventually ‘corner
the market’ of potential adopters, with the other technologies becoming locked out.”23 Network effect pressure renders a highly interconnected system unable to sustain multiple equilibria for long
periods because the force of network effects invariably pushes the
market towards a single dominant standard—in this case, a dominant standard in the market for investment arbitration services. The
process may create institutional lock-in.
2.2. Institutional Lock-in
First developed by North in the early 1990s, the concept of institutional lock-in applies the concept of increasing returns and path
dependency identified in relation to certain technological standards
of institutional arrangements.24 North believes that the path de-

22 TIM WEITZEL, ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS IN INFORMATION NETWORKS 19 (2004).
Such markets are also termed “hyperselective.”
RUDI BEKKERS, MOBILE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS: GSM, UMST, TETRA, AND ERMES 196 (2001).
23 Arthur, Competing Technologies, supra note 5.
24 See NORTH, supra note 7 (detailing the relationship between organizations and
institutions and characterizing the manner in which they evolve alongside technology within the greater economy). While path dependence theory was first formulated as an explanation of technology adoption, the theory has had a conceptual
impact on evolutionary economics. See, e.g., RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G.
WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 206–07 (1982) (“Firms at
any time are viewed as possessing various capabilities, procedures, and decision
rules that determine what they must do given external conditions.”). Indeed, it has
a wide scope of potential application. As David Grewal opines: “[T]he discussion
of network externalities has been largely restricted to problems of technical coordination and the compatibility of different technology products, which can seem to
limit its broader relevance. Nevertheless, the insights of this literature may have a
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pendence concept has “equal explanatory power in helping us understand institutional change. In both cases increasing returns are
the key to path dependence . . . .”25 North’s translation of the path
dependence thesis to institutions identifies several causes of increasing returns with respect to institutions: (a) the high start-up costs
involved in setting up alternative institutions from scratch; (b) the
significant learning effects for an organization; (c) direct and indirect
coordination effects driven by interconnection with other organizations; and (d) the reduction in uncertainty regarding the permanency of the rules of an organization.26 Taken together, these features, North argues, will produce “massive increasing returns”27 that
will channel the development of institutions in a path dependent direction.28
The positive feedback produced will “cause the path of institutional change to be locked in a specific pattern . . . .”29 The “increasing-returns characteristics of the institutional matrix and the complementary subjective models of the players suggest that although
the specific short-run paths are unforeseeable, the overall direction
in the long run is both more predictable and more difficult to reverse.”30 Thus, when institutions generate increasing returns, it becomes very difficult for rival institutions to successfully vie for market dominance.31
As G. John Ikenberry explains, “[w]hen
institutions manifest increasing returns, it becomes very difficult for
more general application.” DAVIS S. GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL
DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 63 (2008).
25 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 109 n.10 (1991).
26 See NORTH, supra note 7, at 95 (applying W. Brian Arthur’s four self-reinforcing
mechanisms to a world in which there are increasing returns to institutions).
27 Id.
28 See GRAEME DONALD SNOOKS, THE EPHEMERAL CIVILIZATION: EXPLODING THE
MYTH OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION 92–93 (Taylor & Francis 2003) (summarizing North’s
application of path dependency to a world of increasing institutional returns and
how North believes it explains both inefficient institutional systems and differential
economic performance).
29 SHUANPING DAI, NETWORKS OF INSTITUTIONS: INSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCE,
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF POLICIES 43 (2015).
30 NORTH, supra note 7, at 104.
31 DAI, supra note 29.
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potential replacement institutions to compete and succeed.”32 Put
simply, institutions become, in effect, “monopolies” in the markets
within which they operate.
We argue that the world of investment arbitration is experiencing
a form of institutional lock-in. Unlike North, however, we are not so

much concerned with organizations becoming locked into inefficient
rules and norms; rather, we are interested in how actors become
locked into the organization itself, specifically, ICSID. We identify

three sources of increasing returns with respect to the field of investment arbitration that has produced a high degree of institutional
lock-in. It is to these three sources of increasing returns that we now
turn.
3. HOW NETWORK EFFECTS REINFORCE THE MARKET DOMINANCE OF
ICSID AND CREATE INSTITUTIONAL LOCK-IN

3.1. Direct Versus Indirect Network Effects
The network externalities that underpin and reinforce ICSID are
a species of network effects known in the literature as indirect network effects.33 Network effects may emerge with respect to a wide
variety of goods or services beyond merely physically networked
32

G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND

THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 70 (2009).
33 As opposed to direct network effects, which derive their force purely from the
synchronization value they provide. For a deeper explanation of the distinction
between indirect and direct network effects, see Druzin, supra note 20, at 149–53; see
also Paul Klemperer, Network Goods (Theory), THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 2008) (explaining the common mechanism by
which one network tends to succeed amid competition between incompatible networks); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 5 (outlining three sources of positive
consumption externalities—positive consumption externalities being the increase
in utility that a user derives from a good due to the increase in the number of total
users of that utility); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 19, at 488–94 (distinguishing
between what they term “actual networks,” “virtual networks,” and “positive feedback effects”).
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items, such as telecommunications, or networks that rely on direct
interaction between users, as in the case of languages. The literature
distinguishes between network externalities that involve direct interaction between network participants (i.e., direct network effects)
and those that involve “mediation through the marketplace” in the
form of decreased costs, etc. (i.e., indirect network effects).34 While
less obvious, indirect network externalities can exert significant
pressure on a market.
To illustrate the power of indirect network effects, consider taxi
cabs in Hong Kong. Virtually every taxi cab in Hong Kong is the
identical car model—a Toyota Crown Comfort YXS10.35 There is,
however, no regulatory requirement stipulating that cabbies use this
model. The Toyota Crown Comfort YXS10 gained ascendancy as a
consequence of indirect network externalities stemming from its
widespread use. For instance, because it is widely used, the price of
replacement parts for the Toyota Crown Comfort YXS10 is comparatively cheap, auto body shops able to service the vehicle are more
numerous, and the automobile is more distinguishable as a taxi to
potential patrons. Now consider the position of a new taxi driver
plugging into this powerful system of indirect network externalities
who is theoretically “free” to select any model of car he or she
wishes. The driver will effectively be compelled to purchase the
Toyota Crown Comfort YXS10, which in turn further reinforces the
car’s market dominance.

S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of
Market Failure?, 17 RES. L. & ECON. 3 (1995). For a more formal overview of the
concepts of positive feedback and self-reinforcement, see Scott E. Page, Path
Dependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87 (2006).
35 See Yoree Koh, Toyota Chief: I’ll Take the Taxi, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2011, 2:14
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/03/10/toyota-chief-ill-take-thetaxi/ [https://perma.cc/BHN2-X9S5?safari=1] (noting success of the Toyota
Crown Comfort YXS10 in the taxi market in Japan and Hong Kong); COLIN
BAMFORD & SUSAN GRANT, CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL AS AND A LEVEL ECONOMICS
COURSEBOOK 163 (3d ed. 2014), https://www.gceguide.xyz/files/e-books/alevel/Cambridge%20International%20AS%20and%20A%20Level%20Economics.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB48QSN9] (stating the fact that Hong Kong has 15,000, mostly privately owned Toyota
taxis).
34
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This network effect is indirect—the effect is “mediated through
the marketplace.” Indeed, the advent of the automobile itself is a
good example of indirect network effects in action. Initially, the lack
of suitable roads during the early days of the automobile was an issue. However, as more people purchased cars, more surfaced roads
were built to better accommodate motorized vehicles. With more
surfaced roads, the utility of owning a motor vehicle increased, attracting more consumers. And on it went in a self-reinforcing process.36
We argue that indirect network effects are manifest with respect
to the dominance of ICSID in the market for investment arbitration.
Indirect network effects emerge in three primary ways. To some extent, these mirror North’s argument summarized above, which is
based on indirect network effects; however, the sources of increasing returns we cite below are specific to the character of investment
arbitration. Together, these three indirect network effects produce
increasing returns that push forcefully towards institutional lock-in.
3.2. Impression of Legitimacy
The first relates to a general impression of institutional legitimacy. An arbitration center’s reputation will increase commensurate with growth in its user base. An institution that is a recognized
authority will attract more “users” thereby increasing its user base
in a self-reinforcing fashion.37 This appears to be the case with

36 Katz and Shapiro argue that positive consumption externalities include indirect support networks. Katz and Shapiro use an example drawn from the American
automobile market in the twentieth century where “foreign manufacturers’ sales
initially were retarded by consumers’ awareness of the less experienced and thinner
service networks that existed for new or less popular brands.” Katz & Shapiro,
supra note 5.
37 It should be noted, however, that this is not a perfect market, in that, actors’
choices are somewhat constrained by the prescription of specific arbitral
institutions under investment treaties. Yet, these selections should also be affected,
albeit in a less obvious fashion, by network effects.
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ICSID, which has experienced escalating growth over the last two
decades.38
Figure 1. The figure shows the total number of ICSID cases
registered by calendar year.
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These numbers could of course simply reflect growth in the number of investment arbitration cases more generally, and it is true that

38 INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES [ICSID], THE ICSID CASELOAD–
STATISTICS 7 chart 1 (2017) [hereinafter ICSID, CASELOAD STATISTICS], https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%2020171%20(English)%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5TD-35RG]. For a general discussion of legitimacy challenges relating to investment arbitration and their implications for ICSID, see Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Legitimacy of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, in LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 234
(Nienke Grossman et al. eds., forthcoming 2018).
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in the past several years the filing of non-ICSID Convention cases39
has also increased. The Pluricourts Centre of Excellence at the University of Oslo has data showing that approximately 41 percent of
the 878 known investment cases have not been ICSID Convention
cases.40 The ratio of ICSID to non-ICSID cases varies from year to
year. UNCTAD’s 2015 Issues Note shows ICSID and non-ICSID
cases as having been instituted in approximately equal numbers for
some years, but with ICSID cases eclipsing those of its (collective)
rivals in others.41 Overall, however, it is clear that ICSID’s market
share seems to be holding steady or increasing as the total number
of cases has increased. Thus, we believe its market-dominant position—with 59 percent of known treaty cases submitted under ICSID
Convention, and even more administered by the Centre under other
arbitration rules—is well established.
The fact that ICSID is widely recognized and extensively used
provides a certain reassurance to claimants. As of December 2017,
ICSID boasted 161 signatory States and 153 States Party to ICSID
Convention.42 Because contracting member states agree to enforce
and uphold ICSID arbitral awards as if they are final judgments of
their own courts, actors are confident that ICSID awards will be honored and enforced. This impression of legitimacy only strengthens
as its customer base increases—a classic self-reinforcing process.

39 For purposes of this Article the term “ICSID cases” refers to cases submitted
under the ICSID Convention and its accompanying arbitration rules but does not
encompass other cases administered by ICSID but submitted under other arbitral
rules, such as the ICSID additional facility rules or the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) rules.
40 Daniel Behn, The Performance of Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE
PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Theresa Squatrito et al. eds.,
2017).
41 U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS
No. 1, at 5 fig. 2 (Feb. 2015), http://unctad.org/en/Publications Library/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQL3-BS6C].
42 Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Database of ICSID Member States,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XQL3-BS6C] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
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Impressions of legitimacy may be connected to North’s argument
that “adaptive expectations aris[e] from the prevalence of contracting based on the existing institutions.”43 That is, the increasing certainty regarding the permanency of the rules of an institution creates
a situation of increasing returns related to that institution.
3.3. Predictability and Familiarity with the Rules
The second source of increasing returns we identify relates to predictability and familiarity regarding the rules and procedures of the
institution. With widespread use, users gain a greater familiarity
with the rules and procedures of that particular institution. Indeed,
ICSID Convention arbitration is an option—sometimes the only option—in numerous investment treaties. This creates a positive feedback loop: The more frequently the services of ICSID are utilized,
the more familiar these services become to potential users, encouraging more users to opt for ICSID. This is equally true for the lawyers who represent these claimants. The more claimants go to
ICSID, the more lawyers advise clients to go to ICSID. The greater
the number of cases decided by ICSID Convention tribunals, the
more ICSID Convention arbitration is likely to be studied by counsel
and recommended as the best option. This dynamic mirrors North’s
observation that learning effects connected to the institution—
namely, users’ growing understanding of the institution’s rules and
complexity of use—is an additional source of increasing returns.44
3.4. Quality and Scope of Arbitral Service
The third source of increasing returns relates to the general quality and scope of arbitral service. Breadth and expertise of arbitral
services are powerful considerations for claimants. Institutions vary
in terms of their reputation for competence in dealing with a wide
43
44

North, Institutions, supra note 25, at 109.
See NORTH, supra note 7, at 95.
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array of legal matters. This reputation also builds on itself. If the
institution is perceived as possessing a high degree of competence
in specialized areas of dispute, the institution will attract more
claimants in these areas.45 To date, ICSID has administered over 550
cases, some 73.6 percent of which were based on investment treaties,46 distributed across an impressively wide swath of economic
sectors.
Figure 2. The chart below shows the distribution of all ICSID
registered cases by economic sector as of December 31, 2015.47
Oil, Gas & Mining (26%)
Electric Power & Other Energy (17%)
Water, Sanitation & Flood Protection (5%)
Construction (7%)
Tourism (4%)
Other Industry (12%)
Transportation (9%)
Services & Trade (3%)
Finance (7%)
Information & Communication (6%)

These indirect network effects generate self-reinforcing pressure
for claimants to take their matters to ICSID, bolstering the market
dominance of the arbitration center. The presence of indirect network effects in the market for arbitration services is significant because network effect pressures will have the peculiar effect of “locking in” a standard, rendering it tenaciously resistant to competition.
The result is that institutional lock-in occurs. Ikenberry defines the
process thusly: “[M]ore people and more of their activities are
hooked into the institution and its operations. A wider array of individuals and groups, in more countries and more realms of activities, have a stake—or a vested interest—in the continuation of the

45 While, typically, the disputants jointly agree to the arbitrator, ICSID does have
a roster of arbitrators from which the Secretary-General has to appoint absent party
agreement.
46 ICSID, CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 38, at 7 chart 1, 10 chart 5.
47 Id. at 12 chart 12.
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institution.”48 The result is that the “costs of disruption or change in
the institutions grow over time. This means that ‘competing orders’
or ‘alternative institutions’ are at a disadvantage. The system is increasingly hard to replace.”49 Any serious assessment of the likelihood of institutional competition from other regions of the globe in
the field of investment arbitration needs to consider the implications
of this dynamic.
3.5. Critical Mass and Penguins
If there are no bounds to increasing returns, a networked market
will eventually induce a lock-in situation—“a point is reached after
which every agent, regardless of inherent preferences, will select the
same technology.”50 Once a monopoly emerges, it becomes locked
in as “no actor is willing to bear the disproportionate risk of being
the first adopter of a standard and then becoming stranded in a
small network . . . .”51 This inability to challenge a locked-in standard is known as the start-up problem.52 As one scholar observes, any
system that “share[s] the characteristics of lock-in—the presence of
network externalities, the absence of entrepreneurs who can induce
transition, and the absence of a centralized authority that can mandate simultaneous change—could be as vulnerable to path dependence as technological standards.”53 Under such conditions, it is extremely difficult for a new standard to start up and dislodge a
standard that is already locked in as a result of powerful network
effects.
48 IKENBERRY, supra

note 32.

49 Id.
50 Paul A. David & Shane Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards:
An Introduction to Recent Research, 1 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 3, 6 (1990),
https://www.dl.icdst.org/pdfs/files/03ecaab6441c4ce75bdb187b0e539384.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7MT-EP4A].
51 WEITZEL, supra note 22, at 16.
52 North identifies this dynamic as the problem of large initial set-up costs. See
NORTH, supra note 7, at 95.
53 Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 820
(1998).
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It becomes a problem of critical mass. What is termed hysteresis
effect plays a crucial role here.54 The hysteresis effect states that “the
product is only interesting for potential customers if a critical mass
of consumers is reached such that the sum of original and derivative
utility outweighs the respective costs” of adopting a new standard.55
A certain chicken and egg paradox emerges: “many consumers are
not interested in purchasing the good because the installed base is
too small, and the installed base is too small because an insufficiently small number of consumers have purchased the good.”56
This makes it very difficult to achieve sufficient critical mass. If only
a fraction of the market adopts a new technology, for many users the
gains will be below costs.57 The market will therefore become locked
in with no one willing to bear the costs of switching to a new standard.58 This has been termed the “penguin effect”: “Penguins who
must enter the water to find food often delay doing so because they

54 A. KEMPER, VALUATION OF NETWORK EFFECTS IN SOFTWARE MARKETS: A
COMPLEX NETWORKS APPROACH 73 (2010).
55 Id. at 73–74. For this principle, see Nicholas Economides & Charles Himmelberg, Critical Mass and Network Evolution in Telecommunications, in TOWARD A
COMPETITIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1994
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 47 (Gerald W. Brock ed.,
1995); Michel Clement et al., Netzeffekte und Kritische Masse [Network Effects and Critical Mass], in MARKETING MIT INTERAKTIVEN MEDIEN: STATEGIEN ZUM MARKTERFOLG
[MARKETING WITH INTERACTIVE MEDIA: STRATEGIES FOR MARKETING SUCCESS] (Sönke
Albers et al. eds., 1998); Soon-Yong Choi & Andrew B. Whinston, The Future of the
Digital Economy, in HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 25 (Michael Shaw et al.
eds., 2000).
56 Nicholas Economides & Charles Himmelberg, Critical Mass and Network Size
with Application to the U.S. FAX Market 47, 51 (N.Y.U. Stern Sch. of Bus., Working
Paper No. EC-95-11, 1995), http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/95-11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7KG-4BM3].
57 David & Greenstein, supra note 50, at 9.
58 Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 940 (1986).
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fear the presence of predators. Each would prefer some other penguin to test the waters first.”59 This dynamic greatly inhibits competition in the market, keeping a user base locked into a standard.60
The danger, of course, is the standard that locks in is sub-optimal.61 Indeed, the literature on standards suggests that network-effect markets “may exhibit ‘excess inertia’ and remain locked into a
standard, even though an objectively ‘better’ standard is available.”62 The result of this may be a situation in which an institution
grows profoundly Pareto-inferior due to shifting exogenous conditions, yet its market dominance cannot be successfully challenged
by more efficient institutional arrangements.63 In this way, institutional development—both within and between institutions—may
grind to a pernicious halt, becoming stunted and inefficient.

Id. at 493 n.9.
For a discussion of the potential hazards of lock-in in relation to law, see Gillette, supra note 53, at 813 (positing that lock-in can result in institutional inefficiencies where an institution may become excessively routinized, choice limiting, and
slow to adapt); Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usage for International
Sales, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 707, 711–12 (1999) (discussing lock-in in relation to trade
usages standards); see also Bryan H. Druzin, Why does Soft Law have any Power
Anyway?, ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 1–18 (2016) (discussing the possibility of sub-optimal
lock-in with respect to soft law); id. at 14–16 (noting that locked-in soft law
instruments may, in principle, be dislodged by more innovative or more efficient
rules). See generally Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 759 (1995) (increasing returns in corporate contract
terms, arguing that network externalities can induce standardization in firm contracts); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 19, at 481 (suggesting ways “particular legal
rules should—and should not—be modified to take account of network effects”).
In the political science literature, the idea of network lock-in has been applied more
generally to the process of globalization. See GREWAL, supra note 24; see also Beth A.
Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the
International Economy, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 171 (2004), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3157884/Simmons_GlobalizationLiberalization.pdf?sequence=2 [https://perma.cc/9CN8-ZCD7].
61 Klausner, supra note 60, at 765. But see Lemley & McGowan, supra note 19, at
494 (arguing against the assumption that network effects produce suboptimal lockin).
62 Page, supra note 6, at 961.
63 KEMPER, supra note 54, at 76–77 (discussing Pareto-inferior market results from
network lock-in).
59
60
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4. THE POSSIBILITY OF “DISRUPTIVE EVENTS” AND “INSTITUTIONAL
BREAK-OUT”

4.1. Institutional Break-out
The effects of lock-in, however, may not be quite as robust as the
model projects. Indeed, the inevitability of a lock-in effect is the subject of some debate in the literature. Liebowitz and Margolis question the notion that network effects induce a permanent monopoly,
arguing that although there are indeed periods of persistent lock-in
where one product dominates the market—they look at the software
market—network effect markets will frequently tip towards a new
monopoly64 in a process which they termed “serial monopoly.”65
A variety of considerations can disrupt a lock-in effect. Liebowitz
and Margolis, for example, argue that major product innovations
and predatory pricing can successfully challenge a locked-in monopoly.66 Building on this insight, others have noted that network
effects do not inevitably result in natural monopolies, and that
“[d]ifferences in the quality of competing network goods, or in their
production costs may offset the relative advantage of the larger network.”67 Thus, the presence of network effects does “not necessarily
64 But see STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS, AND
MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 227–29 (2001) (stating that their data provides no support for the concept of tipping even though it is
reasonable in principle).
65 Id. at 10; see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J. L.
& ECON. 1, 2–3 (1990) (refuting the much-cited QWERTY keyboard example of lockin, claiming that evidence of the superiority of Dvorak, a keyboard competitor to
the QWERTY layout, is lacking); see also William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535,
539–46 (1996); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 5.
66 LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS, AND MICROSOFT, supra note 64, at
110.
67 Aviram, supra note 19, at 15; see also Liebowitz & Margolis, Network Effects and
Externalities, supra note 17, at 672 (noting that in instances where production costs
lead to significant decreasing returns, competing incompatible markets can
emerge).
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result in a winner-takes-all situation: they can partly or fully be undone by other factors . . . .”68 Katz and Shapiro contend that if “rival
systems have distinct features sought by certain consumers, two or
more systems may be able to survive by catering to consumers who
care more about product attributes than network size.”69 In such
cases, multiple equilibria can be sustained and competition may
emerge.
However, users in a situation of institutional lock-in face a massive coordination problem: Absent a regulator that can facilitate (or
even mandate) a simultaneous jump to a new network by all the
members, it is very difficult for users to break away from the prevailing institutional standard. Under such conditions, some inherent feature provided by an upstart competitor or a significant transformation in exogenous conditions is required. We argue that
various disruptive events may produce what is termed institutional
break-out.70
4.2. Potential Disruptive Actions by the European Union
Is institutional break-out on the horizon for investment arbitration? That is the question we must ask and seek to answer. Various
possibilities could constitute a disruptive event that might knock users into a new equilibrium. To be sure, investment arbitration is in
a period of turmoil. The European Union’s proposal for the establishment of an investment “court” that includes an appellate body is
68 BEKKERS,

supra note 22.
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93, 106 (1994).
70 The term “institutional break-out” has been applied in a variety of ways but
generally connotes the meaning implied here (i.e., undercutting the hold institutional lock-in has on the market). See, e.g., SABINA STILLER, IDEATIONAL LEADERSHIP
IN GERMAN WELFARE STATE REFORM: HOW POLITICIANS AND POLICY IDEAS TRANSFORM
RESILIENT INSTITUTION 34–36 (2010); Edwin Woerdman, Tradable Emission Rights, in
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 364, 368–71 (Jürgen G. Backhaus
ed., 2d ed. 2005); Oscar Couwenberg & Edwin Woerdman, Shifts in Gas Market Governance: Path-Dependent Institutional Innovation in the Netherlands, in INNOVATION:
TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 25, 37–38 (Aloys Prinz et al. eds.,
2006); EDWIN WOERDMAN, IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO MECHANISMS: POLITICAL
BARRIERS AND PATH DEPENDENCE 90–101 (2002).
69
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the most visible example of how investor-state dispute settlement
might change over the coming years. Whether this proposal is truly
a sea change that will result in a challenge to ICSID’s market dominance is unclear. A great deal depends on how broadly the European Union succeeds in implementing its two-tiered investment
court and whether, as currently seems likely, ICSID is chosen to be
the only or one of the institutions that hosts the court, even if those
proceedings do not take place under the auspices of ICSID Convention. Other exogenous factors might come into play as well; other
market actors already vie with ICSID to host investment arbitrations, a trend that one can only expect to continue.
The European Union has concluded two free trade agreements
whose investment chapters include proposals for a two-tiered investment court, though neither has yet entered into force.71 Moreover, the investment court aspect of CETA is one piece of the agreement that will not be provisionally applied due to the reservations
of Wallonia, and perhaps other European provinces and countries
as well.72 The European Union has proposed that a similar institution be included in the T-TIP that it had been negotiating with the
United States.73 The election of President Trump puts those negotiations in doubt. The EU-Singapore FTA, negotiations for which

71 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) art. 8.18, Sept. 21,
2017, [hereinafter CETA] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf [https://perma.cc/T84Q-3M36]; Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, opened for signature
Jan.
2016,
[hereinafter
EU-Vietnam
FTA]
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3563
[https://perma.cc/7ADZ-ZF9B] (Section 3: “Resolution of Investment Disputes”
and Section 3, Sub-Section 4: “Investment Tribunal System”).
72 Council Decision 10974/16 of Oct. 5, 2016, on the Provisional Application of
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada, of
the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part,
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10974-2016-INIT/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/YQ3D-5KH8] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018) (excluding most of
Chapter 8 from provisional application).
73 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: European Union’s Proposal
for Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment Disputes art. 3.4, Nov. 12,
2015,
[hereinafter
T-TIP
Proposal]
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4FH-N8BX].
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were concluded on October 17, 2014, does not yet contain the court,74
but one expects that the European Union might re-open negotiations
to include a similar mechanism,75 or possibly that a parallel agreement addressing investment and any other matters of shared competence will be negotiated in order that the EU-Singapore FTA can
be finalized by the European Union alone.76
The European Union sees the establishment of these courts as nuclei, which would presumably be merged, for a multilateral invest-

74 See EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 9.1, Oct. 17, 2014, [hereinafter
EU-Singapore FTA] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961
[https://perma.cc/X26X-TFC2].
75 See Michael P. Daly & Jawad Ahmad, The EU-Vietnam FTA: What Does it All
Mean? What Does it Mean for the Future?, WOLTERS KLUWER: ARB. BLOG (Dec. 14, 2015)
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/12/14/the-eu-vietnam-ftawhat-does-it-all-mean-what-does-it-mean-for-the-future/
[https://perma.cc/6F6N-5BJU] (“The EU may seek to propose an Asia-wide permanent investment court to resolve disputes arising under the FTAs that the EU is
currently negotiating with some Asian States (Malaysia, Thailand, India, Philippines and Japan). While the EU-Singapore FTA, which is pending signature and
ratification, does not provide for the creation of a distinct permanent investment
court, it does establish a joint committee (known as the ‘Trade Committee’) comprised of the Parties’ Trade representatives with the task to, inter alia, oversee the
implementation of the FTA, consider amendments to the FTA and issue binding
decisions. With these wide powers, the creation of an Asia-wide permanent investment court is not entirely farfetched. The Trade Committee is tasked, after all, to
examine whether an appellate mechanism could be created (Article 9.30(1)(c) of the
EU-Singapore FTA).”); see also Simon Lester, From ISDS to ICS, WORLD TRADE L.:
INT’L ECON. L. & POL. BLOG (Dec. 2, 2015, 12:30 PM) http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2015/12/from-isds-to-ics.html
[https://perma.cc/33YT-862V] (“[T]here’s the question of the yet to be ratified preICS [the “Investment Court System”] FTAs that still have old ISDS rules in them,
such as . . . the EU-Singapore FTA. Can those really be ratified as currently written,
when the new and improved version of ISDS is out there, being sold as a better
alternative?”).
76 Avis 2/15, Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full Court), ECLI:EU:C:2017:376 (May
16,
2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dce538338459ff41c3868deb27de5740b9.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxyNaxf0?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=D
OC&docid=190727&occ=first&dir=&cid=555503 [https://perma.cc/VQ5R-79JY].
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ment court to which investor-state dispute settlement in all EU investment agreements, at the least, would be brought.77 One way to
achieve a multilateral court is gradually, by accretion, such that once
the European Union has replaced or has caused its member states to
re-negotiate all extra-EU BITs, they would lead to that multilateral
court.78 A different option, which is being pursued simultaneously,
is to establish a multilateral investment court open to all parties.
The potential for reform of investor-state dispute settlement, including the possible establishment of a multilateral investment
court, is currently the subject of study by United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Working Group
III.79 The establishment of a multilateral investment court is by no
means a foregone conclusion; the first meeting convened to discuss
the project, in late November 2017, was marked by an unusual degree of dissension. UNCITRAL ordinarily operates by consensus,
but this meeting featured the group’s second vote ever—after the
1979 decision to move UNCITRAL’s headquarters from New York
to Vienna—on the election of a Chair.80
The Working Group’s mandate encompasses more than the consideration of whether the international community should establish
an international investment court, though that is clearly one of the
main proposals it will address. The establishment of such a court
77 Stephen W. Schill, Editorial: U.S. Versus EU Leadership in Global Investment Governance, 17 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 1, 2 (2016) (“The Commission’s proposal to
create a permanent investment court is a strong vision and the text presented constitutes the first concrete step towards practical implementation. . . . The proposal
breathes the right spirit: to transform investor-state arbitration into a truly public,
fully transparent, more predictable and balanced system of global adjudication.”).
78 CETA, supra note 71, art. 8.29; European Commission Press Release
IP/15/5651, Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and Other
EU Trade and Investment Negotiations (Sept. 16, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm [https://perma.cc/5Z7E-W65P].
79 U.N. Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.142 (Sept. 18,
2017).
80 For a description of some of the discussions, see Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL
and ISDS Reform: Not Business as Usual, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-not-business-as-usual/
[https://perma.cc/NFQ8-HBPQ].
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would be a far from simple task. Two unofficial background papers
prepared by the Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement
cover in some detail the hurdles facing the establishment of an international investment court and mechanisms to enable it at least
partially to work within the existing investor-state dispute settlement framework.81 While some countries, notably the European
Union and Canada, favor the creation of a multilateral court, others,
such as the United States and Japan, either appear to be opposed or
have yet to come out on one side or the other.82
Whether any court under any agreement will ever be established
is thus an open question. The European Council’s decision to exclude the investment court from provisional application, followed
by the decision of the CJEU that the EU-Singapore FTA (and by analogy other European FTAs), means that there will be no CETA investment court until twenty-eight or, more likely, twenty-seven83
member states have ratified the Agreement. The portions of the
treaty subject to EU competence have provisional effect as of September 21, 2017, after the European Parliament voted to approve it.84

81 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, Can the Mauritius Convention
Serve as a Model for the Reform of Investor-State Arbitration in Connection with the Introduction of a Permanent Investment Tribunal or an Appeal Mechanism? (June 3, 2017),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/CIDS_Research_Paper_Mauritius.pdf
[https://perma.cc/69QE-C8D4]; Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà,
The Composition of a Multilateral Investment Court and of an Appeal Mechanism for Investment Awards (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/
working_groups/3Investor_State.html [https://perma.cc/LXK2-CX4Y].
82 For a description of some of the debate, see Roberts, supra note 80.
83 The reference to twenty-seven, rather than twenty-eight, is based on the assumption that the United Kingdom will indeed leave the EU and, therefore, only
twenty-seven member states will be left to ratify the CETA. In some member States,
regional parliaments might have to ratify as well. See, e.g., European Council Press
Release 623/16, EU-Canada Trade Agreement: Council Adopts Decision to Sign
CETA (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/28-eu-canada-trade-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/SH64-4CYT].
84 CETA: MEPs Back EU-Canada Trade Agreement, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: NEWS
(Feb.
15,
2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/20170209IPR61728/ceta-meps-back-eu-canada-trade-agreement
[https://perma.cc/ZYF6-E8DR]; see also Hans Von Der Burchard & Alberto Mucci,
POLITICO Pro’s Morning Trade: TTIP Bogged Down in Feta Cheese – CETA Will be a
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At least for now one can assume that CETA will be put to national
and regional Parliaments. (An alternative would appear to be renegotiation of the agreement to exclude those portions of it that are
subject to mixed competence, and then to have the revised agreement approved by the relevant European Union institutions.) Given
the hostility in many member states to investor-state dispute settlement, it is unclear just how difficult ratification will be. Belgium
only agreed to sign the agreement at the European Council after
Canada and the European Union negotiated an interpretive statement that, inter alia, confirmed the parties’ joint intention to work
towards the creation of a multilateral investment court.85
Notwithstanding the interpretive statement’s pledge to establish
a multilateral court, it is far from clear that even the insertion of the
investment court system will be enough to satisfy the critics; German judges have placed on the record their negative reaction to the
T-TIP proposal.86 While there might be a fillip of anti-American sentiment motivating that reaction, investor-state dispute settlement in
any context would seem to raise the same concerns. The hostility in

‘Mixed Agreement’, POLITICO (May 12, 2016), https://www.politico.eu/article/politico-pros-morning-trade-ttip-bogged-down-in-feta-cheese-and-ceta-willbe-a-mixed-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/4K5Z-THVP]. This decision follows
the Commission’s referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union as to
whether the EU–Singapore Agreement is a mixed agreement. See European Commission, Singapore: The Commission to Request a Court of Justice Opinion on the Trade
Deal, EUROPEAN COMM’N: NEWS ARCHIVE (Oct. 30, 2014) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1185 [https://perma.cc/4WLF-BNU8].
85 Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, Doc. No.
13541/16 (Oct. 27, 2016), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST13541-2016-INIT/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/FLP5-TYN4].
86 Opinion No. 04/16 on the Establishment of an Investment Tribunal in TTIP – The
Proposal from the European Commission on 16.09.2015 and 11.12.2015, (Feb. 2016),
http://canadians.org/sites/default/files/tpp-deutsche-richterbund-opinion0216.pdf [https://perma.cc/S792-RAZ6]; see also Germany’s Judges and Public Prosecutors Reject Proposed Investment Court System in TTIP, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS
(Feb. 29, 2016) https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/germanys-judges-andpublic-prosecutors-reject-proposed-investment-court-system-in-ttip/
[https://perma.cc/5ZFW-TLPB].
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Europe towards FTAs generally and investor-state dispute settlement in particular is unprecedented.87 Less widespread, but still
marked, opposition can be found in other countries as well. Certainly, President Trump has made no secret of his hostility to multilateral agreements.88 But he is not alone—the opposition to FTAs
spanned the political spectrum during the recent U.S. Presidential
elections. As late as April 2016, every remaining U.S. presidential
candidate had spoken against the Trans-Pacific Partnership.89

87 The European Commission received approximately 150,000 comments when
it called for public comment on the proposed inclusion of investor-state dispute
settlement in the T-TIP. While a vast majority of those were ‘form’ comments generated by opponents of investor-state arbitration, some 3,500 were individualized.
Commission Staff Working Document Report: Online Public Consultation on Investment
Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), at 3 (Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4WLF-BNU8]. It is noteworthy, in addition, that the Netherlands recently demanded a referendum on the T-TIP. See Dutch Set to Deliver Second
EU Bombshell Referendum over TTIP Deal, SPUTNIK INT’L (Apr. 15, 2016), http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160415/1038074644/ttip-deal-dutch-referendum.html
[https://perma.cc/CWU6-SCKB]; James Crisp, Dutch Voters now Demanding Referendum on TTIP, EURACTIV (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/dutch-voters-now-demanding-referendum-on-ttip/
[https://perma.cc/CWU6-SCKB].
88 John Cassidy, Donald Trump’s New World Disorder, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 24,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/donald-trumps-newworld-disorder [https://perma.cc/SU48-MEK9] (“Rather than relying on multilateral trade agreements, Trump has said that he will negotiate one-on-one deals with
individual countries, beginning, possibly, with the post-Brexit United Kingdom.”).
89 For instance, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton said about the
TPP: “I want to make sure that I can look into the eyes of any middle-class American
and say, ‘this will help raise your wages.’ And I concluded I could not.’” David
Singh Grewal, Why Hillary Clinton is Right on the TPP, THE HUFFINGTON POST: THE
BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-singh-grewal/whyhillary-clinton-is-ri_b_8295420.html [https://perma.cc/SU48-MEK]. Bernie Sanders was also strongly opposed to the trade deal and stated: “[t]he Trans-Pacific Partnership is a disastrous trade agreement designed to protect the interests of the largest multi-national corporations at the expense of workers, consumers, the
environment and the foundations of American democracy. It will also negatively
impact some of the poorest people in the world.” Bernie Sanders, The Trans-Pacific
Trade (TPP) Agreement Must be Defeated, (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/the-trans-pacific-trade-tpp-agreement-must-be-defeated?in-
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Moreover, these hurdles specific to pending FTAs do not take
into account the other significant problems facing the world community, including the European Union. In June 2016, the United
Kingdom by referendum voted to leave the European Union, rightwing nativist political parties in key European states have seen a
surge in popular support, the refugee crisis remains staggering, and
the fiscal affairs of Greece and certain other member states are persistently bad, with corresponding threats to the Eurozone, if not to
the European Union itself.
Assuming an investment court is established, one significant
question is who will host it? If there is more than one, who will host
them? ICSID is certainly a possibility. It is the institution chosen in
the CETA90 and is one of two institutions proposed—the other is the
Permanent Court of Arbitration—in the T-TIP and the EU-Vietnam
FTA.91 The proposal for a court with an appeals chamber is not fully
compatible with ICSID Convention arbitration. The ICSID Convention stipulates that the only recourse against an ICSID Convention
arbitral award is annulment under the ICSID Convention itself92 and
that only states, which would not include the European Union as
such, can be adherents.93 There is some discussion about whether
line=file [https://perma.cc/MN37-J42L]. Republican presidential candidates Donald Trump and Ted Cruz were also generally opposed to the trade deal. See Jon
Greenberg, Ted Cruz: ‘I always opposed the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership)’, POLITIFACT
(Mar.
10,
2016),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/mar/10/ted-cruz/ted-cruz-i-always-opposed-tpp-trans-pacificpartne/ [https://perma.cc/57GA-5N87]; Clayton Youngman, Trump Says China
Gets an Advantage From the Trans-Pacific Partnership, POLITIFACT (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/nov/12/donaldtrump/trump-says-china-will-take-advantage-trans-pacific/
[https://perma.cc/T3W7-4AZ9]; see also Alex Swoyer, John Kasich: TPP Trade Deal
‘Critical’, BREITBART (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/11/10/john-kasich-tpp-trade-deal-critical/ [https://perma.cc/5GZ6TUNJ] (stating Kasich seemed to be the only presidential candidate in favor of the
TPP).
90 CETA, supra note 71, art 8.27(16).
91 T-TIP Proposal, supra note 73, art. 9.16 (Tribunal of First Instance); EUVietnam FTA, supra note 71, sec. 3, subsec. 4, art. 12.18 (Tribunal).
92 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 1, art. 52.
93 Id. art. 67.
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the ICSID Convention can be amended inter partes although, even if
it can be, the awards would have only limited enforceability.94
This impediment does not mean that ICSID cannot administer the
court’s proceedings—it certainly can, and its qualifications and market position make it eminently qualified to do so. This is the case
whether the arbitration unfolds under ICSID Additional Facility
rules—available if either the home state of the investor or the host
state of the investment is party to the investment treaty—or under
ad hoc arbitration rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.95
That arbitration would not, however, be ICSID Convention arbitration, with its concomitant benefits—the most important of which is
the requirement that each ICSID Convention state treat ICSID Convention awards as if they were final judgments of courts of that
state.96
CETA awards would be enforceable under the New York Convention, but investors could nonetheless face practical hurdles to enforcement. One problem an investor has to overcome, if a state refuses to pay, is the hurdle of “execution immunity”: State assets
(and in this context “state” would include the European Union) are

94 See August Reinisch, Will the EU’s Proposal Concerning an Investment Court
System for CETA and TTIP Lead to Enforceable Awards?—The Limits of Modifying the
ICSID Convention and the Nature of Investment Arbitration, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 761,
782–83 (2016).
95 How the EU Court proposal will be integrated with the current system of international arbitration, where the court in the place of arbitration has the potential
to set aside the award on grounds specified under local arbitration law, is not altogether clear. The assumption is that once the appellate system is in place it will
supplant review in local courts, yet it seems that those arbitrations will still have a
“place” for purposes of judicial assistance to arbitration, for example. CETA provides that the disputing party must not seek to set aside the award once the appellate body structure is fully in place: “Upon adoption of the decision [setting out the
functioning of the Appellate Tribunal]: (b) a disputing party shall not seek to review, set aside, annul, revise or initiate any other similar procedure as regards an
award under this Section . . . .” CETA, supra note 71, art. 8.28.9(b). Whether parties
will necessarily abide by this stricture, and whether local courts will necessarily
dismiss a set-aside application if one is made, may well be put into question.
96 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 1, art. 54.1.
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entitled to immunity, unless they are used for commercial purposes.97 This hurdle must be faced against any state respondent, but
might be particularly difficult against the European Union. To be
sure, this issue would arise only if the European Union refused to
pay an award rendered against it, and the European Union has
pledged to honour any such awards.98 Yet any potential judgment
creditor would likely want to know what its avenue for redress is in
the event the European Union did not pay voluntarily.
One question is how many commercial assets the European Union holds outside the Union in states that are a party to the New
York Convention. Within the European Union itself, no award
against the European Union can be enforced, unless the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) approves it: “The property and
assets of the Union shall not be the subject of any administrative or
legal measure of constraint without the authorisation of the Court of
Justice.”99
Given the European Union’s view that EU law is primary and its
refusal to endorse the payment of any arbitral award that could be
construed as giving state aid to an investor, one might well question
whether voluntary payment would always be forthcoming. For example, the European Union directed Romania not to pay an award
rendered against it in Micula v. Romania on the grounds that the
award constituted an effective payment of the state aid that Romania withdrew from Micula and for which it was ordered to pay compensation.100 CETA itself attempts to avoid this potential problem
by making explicit that withdrawals or refusals to renew subsidies
cannot be the subject of investment arbitrations under the agreement.101 But given likely differences of opinion about what constitutes state aid, it is entirely possible to envision an investment award
97 See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund, State Immunity and the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 302 (Christina Binder et al., eds., 2009).
98 CETA, supra note 71, art. 8.41.2.
99 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol [No. 7] on the
Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, 2008 O.J. (C 310/261), art. 1.
100 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470, Micula v. Romania, Arbitral Award,
(Mar.
30,
2015),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32015D1470 [https://perma.cc/W6FG-MJ95].
101 CETA, supra note 71, art. 8.9.3–4.
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that the European Union, or the CJEU, or both, would regard as unpayable.
At present, it would be difficult for an investment court to be
adopted as part of ICSID Convention regime given the Convention’s
incompatibility with an appellate mechanism and the inability of the
European Union to become a member. Should ICSID be able to
surmount these incompatibilities, perhaps by amendment or perhaps by the addition of a protocol to ICSID Convention that established a parallel mechanism for investment court arbitrations and
which would permit the European Union to become a party (an
“ICSID II”), it would reinforce its position of market dominance.102
Even without those changes, however, ICSID could oversee an investment court system whose awards were enforceable under the
New York Convention. Moreover, given the time it is likely to take
for any court system to be established, ICSID will continue to administer investment treaty arbitrations under the regime foreseen by
existing investment agreements, and investment arbitrations under
investment contracts and investment legislation remain an important part of ICSID’s workload.

4.3. Potential Disruption from Other Regional Sources
ICSID will face competition whether or not the EU proposal
comes to fruition. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is one institution that might be expected to challenge ICSID’s hegemony in investor-state arbitration. Indeed, the PCA is currently overseeing

102 It should be noted, however, that similar problems regarding execution immunity would remain, because Article 55 of the ICSID Convention explicitly maintains execution immunity. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
supra note 1, art. 55 (“Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from
the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any
foreign State from execution.”).
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several investor-state arbitrations103 and has a long pedigree in administering public-international law based disputes.104 Another is
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre which, under the
leadership of its new President, Gary Born, has established specialized rules under which investment arbitrations can proceed as of
January 1, 2017.105 Singapore has already built, in a relatively short
time, an outstanding reputation as a center for commercial arbitration. The reasons for Singapore’s success include the robust support
of the Singaporean government, Singapore’s status as an Asian
transport and commercial hub, and its strong and predicable legal
framework.106 It is also important to underscore the shift of the
103
See Permanent Court of Arbitration, PCA Case Repository,
http://www.pcacases.com/web/allcases/[https://perma.cc/HBJ3-44N5]
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2018).
104
See
Permanent
Court
of
Arbitration,
About
Us,
http://www.pcacases.com/web/aboutus/
[https://perma.cc/5ACJ-AWZG]
(“Established in 1899 to facilitate arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution
between states, the PCA has developed into a modern, multi-faceted arbitral institution that is now perfectly situated at the juncture between public and private international law to meet the rapidly evolving dispute resolution needs of the international community. Today the PCA provides services for the resolution of
disputes involving various combinations of states, state entities, intergovernmental
organizations, and private parties.”); see also BROOKS W. DALY, EVGENIYA
GORIATCHEVA & HUGH A. MEIGHEN, A GUIDE TO THE PCA ARBITRATION RULES 16–26,
¶¶ 3.01–3.24 (2014).
105 SIAC, SIAC IA Rules 2017, supra note 14.
106 According to the SIAC website, the reasons for Singapore’s success are as
follows:

An independent neutral third-country venue consistently ranked in the
top 5 for the least corrupt public sector in the world in the Corruption Perceptions Index. Singapore is also consistently ranked no. 1 for the least
corrupt public sector in Asia in the Corruption Perceptions Index.
• A strong multicultural society, with excellent legal and technological expertise as well as language fluency.
• A central location in Southeast Asia with 6,600 scheduled flights a week
to 320 cities.
• An open economy and business environment that is host to over 7,000
multinational firms.
• The UNCITRAL Model Law is the cornerstone of Singapore's legislation
on international commercial arbitration which is regularly updated to incorporate internationally accepted codes and rules for arbitration.
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global economy to the Asia-Pacific region as businesses tend to think
and act regionally; regional disputes are increasingly likely to be settled in the Asia-Pacific region as opposed to Europe or North America.107
The Kuala Lumpur Regional Center for Arbitration (“KLRCA”)108
is another potential challenger in the Asia region. The KLRCA is an
international organization established in 1978 under the auspices of

• A party to the 1958 New York Convention (on enforcement of arbitration
awards). Singapore arbitration awards are enforceable in over 150 countries worldwide.
• A strong tradition of the rule of law, supported by a highly skilled judiciary that receives top rankings in international surveys.
• The Courts offer maximum judicial support of arbitration and minimum
intervention granting parties full and consistent support in the conduct of
international arbitration.
• Parties have a freedom of choice of counsel in arbitration proceedings
regardless of nationality.
• There is no restriction on foreign law firms engaging in and advising on
arbitration in Singapore.
• Non–residents do not require work permits to carry out arbitration services in Singapore.
• There are excellent facilities and services to support the conduct of arbitration at Maxwell Chambers, Asia’s largest fully-integrated dispute resolution complex with state-of-the-art hearing facilities.
• Lower costs than in almost any other major center of arbitration.
SAIC, Arbitration in Singapore, http://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-43/whysiac/arbitration-in-singapore [https://perma.cc/3MHH-JSES] (last visited Mar. 5,
2018).
107 See Julien Chaisse, The Shifting Tectonics of International Investment Law—
Structure and Dynamics of Rules and Arbitration on Foreign Investment in the Asia-Pacific Region, 47 G.W. INT’L L. REV. 563–638 (2015); see also Jonathan Choo, The Rise and
Rise of Singapore: Singapore as a Preferred Venue for International Arbitration,
SINGAPORE LAW GAZETTE (June 15, 2015), https://singaporeinternationalarbitration.com/2015/06/15/the-rise-and-rise-of-singapore-singapore-as-a-preferredvenue-for-international-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/4SYN-VGUF]. Talk of a
potential Asian Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ACSID”) under the
aegis of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative illustrates the potential impact of a
shift in economic focus.
108 See Kuala Lumpur Reginal Centre for Arbitration, KLRCA Arbitration Rules of
2017, http://klrca.org/ [https://perma.cc/8D6J-KQXJ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
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the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation (“AALCO”).109
The KLRCA was the first regional center established by AALCO in
Asia to provide institutional support as a neutral and independent
venue for the conduct of domestic and international arbitration proceedings in Asia. Its caseload has increased considerably in the last
five years. In addition, recent investment treaties explicitly refer to
the KLRCA for the settlement of investment disputes. In particular,
Article 33 of Section B of the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement allows them to be referred to, inter alia, the
KLRCA.110 The KLRCA’s status as an international organization
and its location in Malaysia—a multicultural state with a true democracy—might also make it attractive to a number of South East
Asian and South Asian states.111
The PCA, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, and the
KLRCA are not the only potential rivals to ICSID.112 Indeed, there
are far too many to list here. The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce has some specialty in arbitrations involving Russia and former Soviet and Soviet satellite states and introduced a few investment-treaty-arbitration provisions in
Appendix III of its 2017 SCC Arbitral Rules. 113 CIETAC also

109 See Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization, About AALCO,
http://www.aalco.int/scripts/view-posting.asp?recordid=1
[https://perma.cc/4H95-PRQC] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
110 The 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement is a multilateral investment treaty between all member States of ASEAN, which comprises Brunei,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Section B of the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement provides for the resolution of investment disputes between an investor and a member
State. For a detailed commentary on the ACUA, see JULIEN CHAISSE & SUFIAN JUSOH,
THE ASEAN COMPREHENSIVE INVESTMENT AGREEMENT: THE REGIONALIZATION OF
LAWS AND POLICY ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 265 (Edward Elgar Publ’g, 2016).
111 The degree to which the KLRCA is wholly free from political influence remains, however, unclear—a point that should be noted.
112 This is not an “either/or” proposition. These institutions are both competitors and collaborators.
113 Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 2017 Arbitration Rules, (Jan. 1, 2017), http://sccinstitute.com/media/169838/arbitration_rules_eng_17_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRH5-HRJ2].
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adopted new rules for investment disputes in 2017.114 Dubai and
Mauritius have relatively new arbitration centers. The International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, the London Court of
International Arbitration, and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (which has recently invited practitioners to opine on
whether it should develop investment arbitration rules)115 are all capable of administering investment disputes, though they are better
known for commercial cases.
Several Latin American countries, led by Ecuador, have proposed
the establishment of a regional arbitral institution to hear investment arbitrations involving members of the Union of South American Nations (“UNASUR”).116
The UNASUR proposal in particular demonstrates the introduction of a preference for regionally based dispute settlement for disputes emanating from that region. Whether any preference for regionally based investment arbitration will emerge in Asia is not clear,
given the paucity of investment arbitration cases involving Asian
states. One might imagine that China, given its “one belt, one road”
policy, would seek to establish an Asian arbitration center. If it were
to do so, would it regard Singapore or Kuala Lumpur or Hong Kong
as an appropriate venue, or would it prefer a Chinese location?
4.4. Judicial Disruptions

114 Kate Apostolova, 2017 Year-in-Review: Top 5 in International Arbitration,
WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 28, 2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/12/28/2017-year-review-top-5-international-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/UC5T-ECLJ].
115 Id.
116 See International Institute for Sustainable Development [IISD], News in Brief:
UNASUR Arbitration Centre One Step Closer to Being Established, 7 INV. TREATY NEWS
9,
10
(Feb.
29,
2016),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/iisd-itn-february-2016-english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Q9JDZH8].
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One of ICSID’s primary advantages—the virtual automatic enforceability of ICSID awards—should help it to maintain its position, yet even there some uncertainties exist.117 Romania and the
European Union challenged the enforceability of an ICSID Convention Award in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after
having established at the District Court that they could seek enforcement on an ex parte basis, which is the process generally applicable
to court decisions of other U.S. courts.118 On appeal the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act required service of process on the foreign sovereign.119 This result
does not prevent the enforcement of the award, but makes the process more cumbersome. One of the claims put forward by the European Union in its amicus curiae brief is that the act-of-state doctrine
should render the ICSID Convention award unenforceable because
the award imposes liability on Romania in a manner that violates
EU laws on state aid.120 If Romania and the European Union were
to be successful on their claims, the enforceability of ICSID Convention awards would be undermined even outside EU member
states—it is already quite clear that the Micula award, for example,
will not be enforced in European Union, notwithstanding its status
as an ICSID Convention award. Incidentally, should the act-of-state
doctrine be found available to be interposed by a state as a defense
to enforcement in the ICSID Convention context, logic would suggest that the argument would be available in defenses to the enforcement of New York Convention awards as well. But there are already

117 Execution immunity, discussed above in the context of New York Convention enforcement, is also applicable in the ICSID Convention Context. Article 55 of
the ICSID Convention specifically conserves execution immunity. See Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 1; T-TIP Proposal, supra notes
73, 91.
118 Micula v. Romania, No. 15 Misc. 107 (Part I), 2015 WL 4643180, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2015), rev’d, No. 15-3109-cv, 2017 WL 4772435 (2d Cir. Oct. 23,
2017).
119 Micula v. Romania, No. 15-3109-cv, 2017 WL 4772435, at *6 (2d. Cir. Oct. 23,
2017).
120 Brief for Amicus Curiae the Commission of the European Union, Micula v.
Romania, (2017) (No. 15-3109-cv), 2017 WL 4772435 (Feb. 4, 2016).
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some limited grounds on which states can challenge the enforcement of New York Convention awards, so the effect on enforceability is much greater vis-à-vis the ICSID Convention.

4.5. Reasons to Expect the Continued Dominance of ICSID
If and when these challenges to ICSID’s hegemony ripen, one
might still expect ICSID to remain dominant for many years. The
investment treaty network comprises approximately 2,700 treaties
currently in force121 and ICSID Convention arbitration is an option
under most of them (and ICSID Additional Facility arbitration is
available in some cases as well); whereas the arbitration centers
mentioned above are much more rarely included as options although some treaties would permit the disputing parties to select another set of rules even if they were not listed in the treaty. ICSID is
thus well entrenched in the existing network of investment treaties.
This widespread treaty “pre-installment” only reinforces institutional lock-in. If treaties are unilaterally terminated, most have a
survival clause providing that the investor may seek the protection
of the treaty for a specified period—often twenty years—which suggests that any wholesale change will not come soon.122 In addition,
121 See UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD: INV.
POL’Y HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/25AYGUFQ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). These 2,700 hundred are the BITs and international investment agreements that have entered into force. Others are pending. At
the end of 2014, UNCTAD identified a total of 3,271 international investment agreements. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment
Governance 106 (2015), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZRA4-FYU3] (“The conclusion in 2014 of 31 international investment agreements (IIAs) —18 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 13 ‘other
IIAs’—brought the total number of IIAs to 3,271 (2,926 BITs and 345 ‘other IIAs’)
by year-end . . . .”).
122 An open question is the effect on investors’ rights if both states to the treaty
terminate the treaty, and in so doing terminate the survival clause. Do states retain
that power, or does the investor have vested rights that cannot be ousted by such
an agreement? For a provocative study of this issue, see Anthea Roberts, Triangular
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investment arbitrations brought under the aegis of investment contracts and investments laws are likely to continue.
Second, even if one were to see the shift from the current approach to investment arbitration to the EU court approach, ICSID is
likely to play at least some—and possibly a dominant—role there as
well. The ICSID Secretariat has already been named as the administrator for CETA investor-state arbitrations even if they do not occur under the auspices of the ICSID Convention.
Third, any shift is likely to be slow in coming. Incremental
change will not immediately displace the ICSID Convention, and
even the establishment of a multilateral investment court would not
immediately displace the existing regime. Countries would have to
sign on to the new court regime, and the ratification of international
treaties tends to be a slow process. For example, the United Nations
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investment Arbitration (the “Mauritius Convention”), which is frequently invoked as a
likely model for the establishment of an investment court in order
for disputes under existing treaties to feed in to the new system, took
nearly three years to enter into force.123 It still has only three state
parties.124
Fourth, should there be a growing demand for regionally based
investment arbitration, it is not necessarily the case that ICSID cannot dominate that market as well. The ICSID Secretariat staff hail
from dozens of countries.125 ICSID has cooperation agreements with
Treaties: The Nature and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353
(2015).
123 United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investment Arbitration, Dec. 10, 2014, U.N. Doc. No. 69/116, https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5XX-5H8J].
124 The parties are Canada, Mauritius, and Switzerland. UNCITRAL, Status:
United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration
(New York, 2014), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention_status.html [https://perma.cc/9ECY-4YSA]
(last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
125
See
ICSID,
Secretariat,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Secretariat.aspx
[https://perma.cc/93Q3-WEQU] (‘The Secretariat consists of approximately 70
staff of diverse backgrounds and nationalities.”) (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
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multiple institutions around the world, including CIETAC, SIAC,
the HKIAC, and the KLRCA,126 and many others as well. ICSID thus
has venues around the world in which it can administer arbitrations.
Indeed, should there be the requisite demand, nothing would stop
ICSID from establishing a regional branch, in China or elsewhere.
5. CONCLUSION
Long-term projections are always hard to make. Will investment
arbitration even continue as a viable form of dispute settlement at
all? Its availability in some 2,700 extant treaties suggests it will last
for some time, but the pace of treaty negotiation has slowed and, as
discussed, whether the European Union and the United States will
continue to negotiate investment treaties and FTAs with investment
chapters in them, either with each other or with third states, is not
certain. If they do, these treaties will not necessarily offer the possibility of investor-state arbitration. The European Union’s proposal
to establish a court could be viewed as saving investment arbitration, but by many critics it will be viewed as not going far enough.127
On the other hand, “state-friendly” modifications to investment
treaties have made it harder for investors to prevail on their
claims.128 Nonetheless, one should recall that at its founding, ICSID
was expected to administer disputes arising under investment contracts, not investment treaties. Thus, while investment treaty arbitration has eclipsed contract arbitration in ICSID’s workload,129 contractual arbitrations will likely continue. ICSID does not have a
126 See ISCID, Other Facilities, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/services/Other-Facilities.aspx [https://perma.cc/35XZ-B56E] (last visited Mar. 27,
2018).
127 See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The European Union’s Proposal for an Investment
Court and its Implications for the Future of International Investment Law (unpublished
manuscript on file with Authors).
128 Lars A. Markert & Catharine Titi, States Strike Back—Old and New Ways for
Host States to Defend Against Investment Arbitrations, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY, 401, 401-435 (Andrea K. Bjorklund ed., 2015).
129 ICSID statistics indicate that overall, the basis of consent invoked to establish
ICSID jurisdiction in registered ICSID cases was found in an investment contract
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monopoly over them, either, but the same network externalities and
market dominance characteristics apply in that area as well.
In sum, if the European Union’s proposals for an investment
court gain traction, and if eventually that court crystallizes into a
multilateral facility that is headquartered in another institution outside ICSID, that institution could eventually rival ICSID for investment arbitration dominance. Such an event would constitute a “disruptive event” sufficient to undermine the institutional lock-in that
we posit currently exists. We may thus witness a period of institutional break-out wherein the market dominance of ICSID is destabilized. Even aside from the European Union’s activities, other existing and even new institutions will continue to compete with ICSID,
and one or more of them could eventually erode ICSID’s market
dominance. Exogenous factors, such as national court decisions that
undermine the enforceability of ICSID Convention awards, could
accelerate that process. Other unforeseen events might also undermine the market dominance of ICSID and trigger either a large-scale
coalescence around an alternative institution or, rather more likely,
the parceling out of investment arbitration among multiple competitors until the market again coalesces around a new standard. Such
a scenario might mean ICSID remains the single most dominant
market force for a period, albeit without a monopoly or quasi-monopoly. Yet, absent a very powerful exogenous shock, ICSID’s institutional strength and its network-effect-reinforced position of
dominance will be hard to unseat.

between the investor and the host state in only 17.3 percent of the cases. The basis
for consent was found in the domestic law of the host state in 9.3 percent of the
cases while the basis for consent in the other cases was found in a BIT (60.3 percent)
or another investment agreement. In 2015, the basis of consent invoked to establish
ICSID jurisdiction in registered ICSID cases was found in an investment contract
between the investor and the host state in only 8 percent of the cases. The basis for
consent was found in the domestic law of the host state in 8 percent of the cases
while the basis for consent in the other cases was found in a BIT (46 percent) or
another investment agreement. See ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV.
DISPUTES [ICSID], THE ICSID CASELOAD–STATISTICS (ISSUE 2016-1) 10 chart 4, 23 chart
3
(2016),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202016-1%20(English)%20final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7XF5-ZGF5].
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